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Due to blockchains’ intrinsic transparency and
immutability, blockchain-based applications are
challenged by privacy regulations, such as the EU
General Data Protection Regulation. Hence, scaling
blockchain use cases to production often fails to owe
to a lack of compliance with legal constraints. As
current research mainly focuses on specific use cases,
we aim to offer comprehensive guidance regarding
the development of blockchain solutions that comply
with privacy regulations. Following the action design
research method, we contribute a generic framework
and design principles to the research domain. In this
context, we also emphasize the need for distinguishing
between applications based on blockchains’ data
integrity and computational integrity guarantees.
1. Introduction
Since its invention in 2009 by Nakamoto [1],
blockchain technology has been widely attested
large potentials in facilitating or improving
inter-organizational digital workflows [2]. This
is mainly due to the transparency established
between various actors: Instead of placing trust
in one distinguished entity, every party within an
ecosystem is given access to the underlying data and
can engage in its verification. The immutability of the
underlying data within a blockchain is often a desirable
feature, since this facilitates auditability even among
mutually distrusting parties. However, the benefits
of information exposure for transparency must be
carefully traded off with related challenges. In specific,
using blockchain technology for data processing often
violates requirements derived from privacy regulation.
For example, the European Union (EU)’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) restricts access to
personal data to legitimate parties for clearly defined
goals only (“purpose limitation”). Furthermore, the
GDPR conflicts with blockchains’ immutability since
it gives subjects a right to rectification (Art. 16) and
erasure (Art. 17) of their data, meaning they can
withdraw their consent to the processing of their data at
any time [3]. These challenges of blockchain technology
in the context of privacy regulation negatively affect
its adoption. For example, GDPR compliance was
identified as a pressing issue for blockchain projects in
the EU Blockchain Observatory & Forum report [4].
However, the neglection of regulatory aspects during
prototyping often hinders later scaling to productive
systems. Sağlam et al. [5] demonstrate that more than
two thirds of blockchain projects do not communicate
about GDPR at all. Consequently, Haque et al. [6]
point out the necessity of further investigating how
blockchain solutions can comply with privacy by
design.
So far, several approaches have been proposed
to meet regulatory compliance in blockchain-based
applications. For example, some researchers
recommend to build upon private permissioned
blockchain implementations that limit data visibility to
registered participants. However, these solutions are
criticized for failing to deliver advantages in comparison
to conventional, centralized information systems [7].
Moreover, while making personal data available to
only a few selected nodes certainly mitigates privacy
issues to some extent, conflicts with GDPR’s purpose
limitation and right to erasure remain. To address the
right to erasure, backdoors have been proposed to make
blockchains redactable [8, 9]; however, it has been
argued that such approaches can severely affect the
security of blockchain implementations [10].
Against this backdrop, Zemler and Westner [11] call
for a comprehensive framework for the development
of GDPR-compliant blockchain solutions. Meanwhile,
cryptographic tools that allow to meet blockchain





technology’s original aims of independent verification
among various stakeholders while addressing privacy
requirements are increasingly used. For example,
storing hashes of data facilitates immutability
proofs without storing sensitive information, and
Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) allow for the on-chain
verification of off-chain computations [12]. This
approach allows to prove computational integrity while
data itself does not need to be disclosed. However,
so far, research and practice lack knowledge on
how these mechanisms can address GDPR-related
requirements. Thus, we ask the research question: How
can blockchain technology and data protection under
the GDPR be reconciled to promote the adoption of
blockchain applications?
We address this research question by proposing a
framework for the development of GDPR-compliant
blockchain-based solutions. We follow an Action
Design Research (ADR) approach and develop our
framework based on both insights gained from a
systematic literature review and from focus groups with
practitioners. In specific, we derive our insights from
the context of the energy sector. The underlying use
case aims to apply blockchain technology for enabling
the verifiability of asset logging information and the
authenticity of guarantees of origin for electricity with
the help of a blockchain. Integrating insights from
both literature and practice enables us to derive design
principles that help reconcile data protection regulation
with blockchain-based solutions by design.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we introduce blockchain technology,
selected privacy-related cryptographic methods, and the
GDPR. We present our methods in Section 3. Section 4
outlines the development process of our framework
during the design cycles. We the present and describe
our framework in Section 5 and discuss our findings and
conclude in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Blockchain
Blockchain technology initially drew attention
with its first application, Bitcoin, a concept for
a decentralized digital currency system [1]. The
underlying technology of Bitcoin solves the immanent
problem of preventing the double-spending of digital
assets in a decentralized system by applying concepts
formerly proposed by Chaum [13] and Back [14] and,
thus, allows for trust-free cryptographic transactions in
a network without any distinguished central entity [15,
16]. As such, a blockchain can be described as a
publicly available immutable registry that stores data in
a linked, append-only list of blocks [16, 17]. Since no
central entity is involved, the network needs to agree on
which blocks to include. For this purpose, blockchain
systems use so-called consensus mechanisms, e.g.,
Proof of Work (PoW) or Proof of Stake (PoS), to find
agreement in a decentralized system and, thus, to secure
the network from attacks [17, 18].
One of blockchains’ core features is immutability,
meaning that retrospectively tampering with data written
to the ledger is hard or practically impossible. For
example, to gain control of the network in PoW
systems, large amounts of hashing power and, thus,
energy and hardware expenditures are required [17,
18]. Furthermore, blockchains can have a tailor-made
design subject to specified parameters that affect access,
participation and governance. Bitcoin and Ethereum,
for instance, comprise permissionless blockchains that
are open to everyone, while blockchains used in
consortia are typically permissioned, meaning that only
authorized members can join the network and participate
in consensus [15, 19]. Consequently, different roles and
rights, e.g., for writing, reading, updating, validating, or
deleting data, arise. In addition, a blockchain can be
either public or private. In public blockchains, the data
is exposed to everyone while in a private blockchain
the records are only visible to the authorized entities
participating on the blockchain [17].
Blockchain systems are not limited to store
transaction data only. So-called smart contracts
incorporate programming logic on a blockchain [20,
21], and if invoked, the corresponding methods
are executed by all blockchain nodes [16, 21].
Therefore, smart contracts provide new opportunities
for the automated processing of data in decentralized
applications, e.g., in supply chain management or
e-government [19, 22].
2.2. Merkle Trees and Zero-Knowledge Proofs
As pointed out, in any design, the list of transactions
is visible to every network participant, thus allowing
for the replicated verification of transactions [17].
This intrinsic visibility of transaction data immediately
results in significant challenges related to the processing
and storage of sensitive information [23]. Consequently,
blockchain system are often supplemented by
cryptographic techniques to hide information that is not
necessary to be disclosed for transaction validation and
business processes that aim to be managed. Probably
the simplest way is to only write hashes of data to
a blockchain to allow for latter proofs that data has
not been manipulated, without disclosing sensitive
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information on-chain. In this context, Merkle trees [24]
can be used to improve privacy and efficiency. A
Merkle tree is created by recursive pairwise hashing;
only the root is then stored on-chain. One can then
prove that data was included at the point of tree
generation by providing the correct path and its adjacent
hashes that lead to the corresponding Merkle root [24].
This approach allows to represent large datasets by
a single on-chain hash and facilitates the efficient
verification of parts of this dataset without revealing
further, potentially sensitive information in a “Merkle
proof” [25].
However, most operations, like conducting payments
and invoking smart contracts, require operations beyond
the checking the integrity of data. In this context,
ZKPs have received increasing attention and usage
in blockchain ecosystems, for example to add a
privacy-preserving layer for digital identities [26]
or distributed payment systems [27]. ZKPs are
cryptographic protocols that convince a verifier that a
(mathematical) statement about data is correct without
revealing the information itself [12]. The prover only
provides information required to assess the correctness
of the statement via a proof but does not have
to disclose any (potentially confidential) additional
information [28, 29]. In the context of blockchains,
ZKPs enable data parsimony as the proof can be
verified succinctly on-chain while sensitive data is
protected and only stored off-chain [30]. For example,
Zcash’s protocol relies on ZKPs to prove the legitimacy
of a transaction while hiding information about the
transaction’s sender, receiver, and amount [31].
2.3. General Data Protection Regulation
In 2018, the EU passed the GDPR for the protection
of natural persons concerning the processing of their
personal data by organizations. The GDPR not
only harmonizes data privacy laws across European
member states but also applies to all European citizens,
irrespective of where the data collection and processing
takes place [32]. According to Art. 1 GDPR, the
imposed law aims at protecting “fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons and their right to the
protection of personal data”. In particular, the GDPR
lists principles relating to the processing of personal
data, defines data subjects’ rights, and specifies the
provisions of a data controller and processor. In general,
the data subject that can grant permission to process
personal data can also revoke its consent at any time (see
Art. 7 GDPR). Notably, Art. 6, para. 1 b) to f) GDPR
list certain cases in which the data processing does
not require an explicit permission. In general, the
processing of sensitive data generally is prohibited (see
Art. 9 para. 1 GDPR) except for certain special cases
(see Art. 9 para. 2 GDPR). According to Art. 16 GDPR,
the data subject always has the right to have inaccurate
personal data rectified. In addition, the data subject
can exercise his or her right to demand the erasure of
personal data against the data controller at any time
(Art. 17 GDPR). Both the right to rectification and the
right to erasure of personal data are generally considered
the most challenging issues in promoting blockchain
use cases [33]. In addition, Haque et al. [6] outline
conflicts regarding responsibilities of controllers and
processors (see Art. 24, 26, 28, GDPR), as well as the
technology’s territorial scope (see Art. 3 GDPR). The
distribution of personal information to third parties in
a blockchain may also conflict with GDPR’s purpose
limitation, data minimization, storage limitation, and
confidentiality [34]. For the reconciliation of blockchain
with the strict requirements of the GDPR, e.g., the right
of rectification and erasure of personal data, we present
current findings of the relevant literature in Section 4.
We also want to point out that GDPR is not the only
data protection regulation that challenges blockchain
applications; for example, the California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) and the recent Chinese Personal
Information Protection Law have similar objectives.
However, the GDPR is generally acknowledged as
particularly strict, which is the main reason why
most research focuses on GDPR and assumes that a
GDPR-compliant blockchain solutions will also address
other privacy regulations’ requirements.
3. Research Design
To answer our research question, we take a
pluralistic approach to obtain rich and reliable results,
thus expanding the literature on blockchain and data
protection in a rigorous way [35]. In specific,
we follow an ADR approach [36] to develop a
framework that supports organizations in aligning their
blockchain-based applications with GDPR and, thus,
to facilitate adoption. Proposed by Sein et al. [36],
ADR supports in the creation of innovative artifacts like
methods or constructs that aim to solve organizational
problems [37, 38]. In total, the research process
involves four stages and seven principles applied by both
practitioners (e.g., individuals with first-hand experience
or end-users) and researchers. We present all four stages
of the ADR process in more detail in Section 4.
Motivated by the problems identified in the ADR
process, we additionally conducted a systematic
literature review following the guidelines of Webster
and Watson [39] and vom Brocke et al. [40]. By
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systematically reviewing the relevant literature on
blockchain and GDPR, we provide a solid foundation
for promoting knowledge, thereby enhancing theory
development and identifying areas that need to be
explored in this domain [40]. We present the results
of the systematic literature review in the problem
formulation’s stage of Section 4.
4. Development of the Framework
We now describe the development of our generic
framework to guide practitioners in their initial design
and development process to create a blockchain-based
application that complies with the GDPR requirements
by design in the context of the ADR approach.
Stage 1: Problem formulation The first stage
aims to identify and conceptualize a problem based
on insights from practice or research. Thus, both
“practice-inspired research” and “theory-ingrained
artifact research” support the mutual understanding
of the research aim [36]. We first encountered the
underlying problem in a practical environment in the
energy industry. In various one-on-one discussions
and workshops, we identified that both energy and law
practitioners considered compliance with GDPR as a
major challenge for adopting blockchain technology.
Additionally, domain-specific regulations, such as the
German Metering Point Operation Act [41], complicate
the use of blockchain technology. When investigating
privacy-preserving solutions, we found that many
projects already lever basic hashing functionalities,
but the use of more advanced cryptographic methods
including Merkle trees and ZKPs as well as knowledge
about their benefits and limitations so far is rare.
In specific, we conducted interviews with leaders
of twelve selected research projects that address
similar use cases and explore the opportunities of
blockchain technology in the energy sector [blinded
for review]. We found that all interviewees were
aware of privacy protection being a significant hurdle
for implementing a blockchain-based solution that
complies with regulation. Still, most described the legal
situation as unclear. Therefore, their research focused
on the technical feasibility and postponed regulatory
considerations or intended to ensure GDPR-compliance
through individual data usage contracts (although this
approach is highly questionable because consent can
still be withdrawn). Nevertheless, certain technical
solutions were applied, including off-chain data
management or permissioned blockchain environments;
often without being aware of the related tradeoffs
indicated in Section 1. Accordingly, we defined the
problem as “lack of a systematic approach on how
blockchain technology and data protection under GDPR
can be reconciled”.
In addition to the insights gained from practice,
we substantiated the perceived need for systematic
knowledge on the reconciliation of blockchain
technology and GDPR by systematically reviewing
existing literature. We identified that the compatibility
of blockchain technology and GDPR represents
a prevailing problem to the blockchain research
community, too. Our findings also allowed us to
structure existing solution approaches regarding the
reconciliation of blockchain technology and GDPR.
We derived our search string applied to articles’ titles
from the main keywords of our research question:
(“blockchain” OR “distributed ledger”) AND (“GDPR”
OR “general data protection regulation”). Our initial
search yielded 126 results including articles from the
databases ACM Digital Library (2), AIS eLibrary (4),
Google Scholar (94), IEEE Xplore (10),
ScienceDirect (2), and Web of Science (14) until
12th of March 2021. Following vom Brocke et al. [40],
we then defined inclusion and exclusion criteria. We
included only peer-reviewed scientific articles published
in English, which resulted in a data set of 66 articles.
We also removed duplicates and excluded articles not
relevant for our underlying research objective, i.e.,
those without an explicit focus on the compliance of
blockchain applications with GDPR. Applying our
exclusion criteria resulted in 17 papers in total for
full-text reading.
Our results indicate that GDPR-compliance and
blockchain technology represents a relevant issue for
both computer science and IS scholars. From our
data set of 17 papers, nine articles take a technical
perspective and propose blockchain architectures
adhering to the GDPR. For example, Farshid et al. [41]
proposes a prototype for the financial industry that
deletes data after a pre-defined time range. Also,
Dauden-Esmel et al. [42] and Truong et al. [43]
propose a GDPR-compliant personal data management
platform. Moreover, Precht and Marx Gomez [44]
develop a prototype that enforces joint controllership
agreements before any data is processed. Generally,
Rieger et al. [33] and Guggenmos et al. [45] conclude
that personal data should not be stored on a blockchain.
The authors propose to use an off-chain mapping
architecture when the use case requires personal data
storage, yet questions around the management of this
mapping remains open. Regarding legal assessments of
blockchain and GDPR, Poelman and Iqbal [7] identified
a dispute between purist and fundamentalist approaches.
While purists are convinced that blockchain and GDPR
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cannot be reconciled as any adjustments break with
original principles, fundamentalists believe in technical
adaptions of the technology to fulfill regulatory aspects.
However, the latter often includes redactable and
mutable blockchains relying on backdoor solutions
like chameleon hashes [46], which undermine trust and
security [10] or are not applicable to permissionless
blockchains. Many of these approaches are also
not applicable to existing, popular blockchains like
Ethereum but would require the development of entirely
new ecosystems. They also do not discuss issues
beyond the right to erasure described in Section 2.3, for
instance, purpose limitation.
Thus, the results from our systematic literature
review confirm the relevance of the identified problem.
Most research exclusively focuses on redactability
to address the right to reasure or considers specific
domains or use cases, e.g. traffic management [47],
e-government [33], or finance [42]. In total, previous
literature on blockchain and GDPR reveals only three
general design principles: Rieger et al. [33] recommend
avoiding personal data storage on blockchain,
using private and permissioned pseudonymization
approaches to process personal data, and implementing
off-chain identifier mappings for the coordination
of cross-organizational workflows. We also found
that authors taking a legal perspective often state that
blockchains need to be tailored to conform to the GDPR,
e.g., [3]. Sağlam et al. [5] find that most blockchain
projects do not acknowledge legal challenges of
blockchain-based solutions and the GDPR and highlight
the urgency for research on data protection regulations
and blockchain technology. Against this backdrop, also
Zemler and Westner [11] call for frameworks for GDPR
compliant processing of personal data using blockchain
technology.
Both the survey of industry experts and the literature
review yield that merely recording encrypted or
hashed data on a blockchain does not necessarily
prevent from violating data protection. For example,
repeatedly referring to a hash on a blockchain can
make it personally identifiable. Moreover, storing
encrypted or hashed data on-chain makes it useless
for the smart contracts observed as they cannot
perform useful computations on obfuscated data (we
have not encountered the use of cryptographic tools
that would allow to do so, such as homomorphic
encryption, in these publications; probably for their
computational complexity). We therefore examined
further techniques and in particular Merkle proofs and
ZKPs. The latter are already being used in the context
of cryptocurrencies and allow sensitive data to be
stored and processed in a fully anonymized and, thus,
# Role Expertise Organization
1 Project lead Energy & blockchain Research ass.
2 Project member Energy & blockchain Research ass.
3 Researcher Law & energy Foundation
4 Researcher Law & energy Foundation
5 Researcher Law & energy Foundation
6 Project lead Law & energy Foundation
7 Attorney Law Law firm
8 Researcher Blockchain Research inst.
Table 1. Interview partners
data-protection-compliant manner. We conclude that
the underlying problem is of high relevance both for
practice and theory (Principle 1). Following Principle 2,
we aim to solve the defined problem by creating
knowledge that is transferable to similar contexts [36].
Thus, we aspire to create a generic framework for data
protection compliance on blockchain-based applications
that can be used across various domains. In specific, we
aim to enable researchers and practitioners to evaluate
the applicability of anonymization techniques according
to their underlying objective.
Stage 2: Building, intervention, and evaluation
In the second stage, we follow the generic scheme for
the organization-dominant development of artifacts to
generate design knowledge, since our primary source
of innovation is organizationally driven [36]. This
approach guided the iterative design and development
of our artifact in multiple intervention and evaluation
cycles to create knowledge that can be transferred to
similar problems (Principles 3, 4, and 5). The alpha
version of our framework was concurrently challenged
by the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge of
practitioners, including legal experts in the energy
domain (see Table 1). In this light, we conducted
unstructured interviews, open discussion rounds, and
multiple workshops in an organizational environment
for a project to build a blockchain platform in the
energy industry. The interview partners 1–6 (see
Table 1) were working with with the authors on a
blockchain-based project in the energy sector. The
various forms of consultation with domain experts were
performed iteratively in order to continuously improve
and evaluate the framework.
After this first iteration cycle, the beta version was
challenged by experts from the blockchain and legal
domain (see Table 1). To refine our artifact, we further
conducted workshops with practitioners and dedicated
experts in the fields of GDPR. These interventions
and evaluations resulted in a framework generalizable
to other domains. Prior to generalizability and thus
transferability to similar problems in other industries,
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the framework lacked certain key elements: First, it
required further information on the stage that data
can be considered sufficiently anonymized. Second,
the possibility of data triangulation and correlation,
i.e., identifying an individual based on metadata that
third parties outside the blockchain may possess
(e.g., location coordinates or energy consumption),
needed to be integrated into the framework. Third,
the applicability of the GDPR and other relevant
legislations (e.g., Art. 50 Metering Point Operation
Act in the energy industry) regarding the processing
of personal data was initially reflected in a unified,
undifferentiated model. Fourth, the restriction of
Art. 16 and 17 of the GDPR, the right to rectification
and erasure, was not explicitly addressed. Fifth, the
framework lacked a stringent sectioning regarding
the different steps involved. Sixth, the aspect of
alternative options of processing personal data when
anonymization is not possible needed to be clarified and
explained in more detail.
Stage 3: Reflection and learning In parallel
to these stages, learnings should be generalized
“to a broader class of problems” (p. 44) in stage
three [36]. As outlined in the previous stage, we
first developed an industry-specific framework that
incorporates requirements from both the energy sector
and the GDPR. To generalize from the industry
specific context and to address the first iterations’
shortcomings, we refined our artifact by making
substantial changes to the design, meta-design, and
meta requirements [36, 48, 49]. The iterative discussion
with practitioners, law experts, and researchers
represented an integral part of continuous reflection and
learning. In this way, we received valuable feedback
to adapt our research approach and to critically reflect
on the current state of the framework, including its
shortcomings. Overall, we refined the artifact in
this stage (Principle 6). Against this backdrop, we
developed an artifact supporting end-users to assess the
reconcilability of blockchain and the GDPR beyond
the energy industry context and thus promote the
implementation of blockchain applications holistically
(see Figure 1).
Stage 4: Formalization of Learning On this basis,
learnings and reflections can be formalized for a range
of field problems in the form of design principles [36].
By developing an industry-independent framework, we
have iteratively formulated design knowledge on the
reconciliation of GDPR and blockchain technology.
Originally stemming from the context of energy
industries, we claim generalizability by incorporating
knowledge and evaluations from legal and blockchain
experts working in other sectors. We fulfill Principle 7
of the ADR not only by generalizing both the problem
and the solution, but also by discussing the literature
and deriving design principles. In this light, we present
four design principles (see Section 6) to extend the
design theory for blockchain and guide the process
of developing blockchain applications to meet the
requirements of the GDPR by design.
5. Presentation of the GDPR Framework
The framework presented in this section aims to
provide guidance for practitioners and researchers
in the development of GDPR-compliant blockchain
solutions. The purpose is to provide this guidance based
on initial questions about the underlying use case and
its data processing requirements. On this basis, a design
recommendation is given. In particular, the contribution
of our framework resides in the distinction between
data integrity and computational integrity, which has
not yet been made explicit in the literature we reviewed.
In the following, we describe the three steps of our
artifact for reconciling blockchain with GDPR.
Verification of personal data In the first step,
it is determined whether the GDPR is applicable.
Furthermore, the user of the framework needs to
assess whether the data that is to be stored on the
blockchain is cryptographically obfuscated, i.e., the
data is encrypted or hashed and hence is neither
readable by the human eye nor can be interpreted by
simple computer programs. If data is obfuscated, it
is important to assess to what extent the data can be
revocered using the technical means available today. In
determining whether technical means are reasonably
likely to be used to identify the natural person, all
objective factors, such as the cost of identification,
metadata or additional data from other contexts needed,
the time required to do so, and the technology available
at the time of processing should be considered (see also
recital 26 of the GDPR). Obfuscated personal data is not
considered personal data only if completely irreversible
anonymization has been carried out (thick arrow line
in Figure 1). Although the GDPR is not applicable in
such cases, it is important to examine further applicable
laws that may be relevant for the blockchain use case.
In certain scenarios, a specific kind of data is processed
and requires a thorough review of industry-specific laws
before data can be recorded on-chain.
If the data at hand is not cryptographically
obfuscated, the question of persons’ direct identification
arises. This could also apply if someone successfully
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Generic framework for processing personal data in the scope of the GDPR
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Figure 1. Generic framework for processing personal data in the scope of the GDPR
decrypts the data with negligible computing power, e.g.,
if a weak encryption technique, a non-cryptographic
hashing algorithm, or too little entropy was used to
initially obfuscate the data. Against this backdrop,
the direct identification of a person is always assumed
if the information available allows the natural person
behind the data to be identified without further ado.
In the energy sector, this would be the case with
habit-related and, thus, correlatable information, such
as unencrypted consumption data, comfort requirements
or information on willingness to pay [50, 51]. Also
potentially increasing computational power in the
future or disruptive decryption possibilities with
quantum computers should be considered by taking into
account whether the information will still be personally
identifiable in the future. Also data that has been
de-personalized to a certain extent needs to be regarded
as personal data within the meaning of the GDPR if
it can be used to infer the identity of the person with
the assistance of other information, provided that the
effort required for identification is not unreasonably
high. When pseudonymized or non-personal data is
being combined to derive the identity of a person, this
is described as “data triangulation” or the “bundling
problem” [52]. This can be caused, e.g., by linking
geographic data and the individual consumption of a
consumer to identify a person.
Anonymization of personal data In the second
step, personal data is being anonymized. In any of the
scenarios in which it is possible to draw conclusions
about the identity of a natural person, the question arises
as to whether data can be anonymized in the first place.
In certain scenarios, data processing requirements do
not allow for the anonymization of personal data. In
addition, anonymization is hindered when there is a lack
of skills or resources to implement these techniques.
However, in most cases data can be anonymized through
obfuscation and involves the question of what exactly
the obfuscated data is needed for. Both the specific
requirements and objectives of the blockchain use case
determine the anonymization technique that will be
applied. If the use case requires the verification of
correct calculations (computational integrity), such as
balances, coordinates, or signatures, we recommend
using ZKPs. It follows that only a (typically succinct)
proof of the statement is provided on-chain, potentially
including additional obfuscated input data, e.g., a
Merkle root that commits to inputs or outputs of the
computation. If, on the other hand, anonymized data on
the blockchain should only ensure that the data has not
been altered in any way (data integrity), Merkle proofs
are appropriate. In this case, only the Merkle root is
stored on-chain. Using ZKPs or Merkle proofs and
ensuring that the data is sufficiently obfuscated so that
it becomes technically impossible to reveal the identity
of individuals can achieve a privacy-preserving record
of data on the blockchain that does not fall within the
scope of the GDPR. As mentioned above, additionally,
reviews of industry-specific requirements regarding the
Page 4637
processing of personal data should be conducted.
Obligations and right of the GDPR In the third
step, obligations, and rights in the context of the GDPR
are examined. While it may be possible that in certain
events personal data might not be anonymizable, the
GDPR highlights several exemptions, which allow
for the processing of this data anyhow. Part of these
exemptions are a list of certain cases in which the
processing of personal data is permitted, e.g., when it is
necessary in the fulfillment of a contract, pre-contractual
measures or when there is a legal obligation (also see
Art. 6, para. 1 b) to f) of the GDPR). In addition,
there are ways for data processing under national law,
which is permitted in certain cases. Thus, beyond the
applicability of the GDPR, the end-user should consider
that other cases may need to be acknowledged, too.
6. Discussion and conclusion
By providing a framework for the GDPR-compliant
processing of personal data in blockchains-based
architectures, we are following the call by Zemler and
Westner [11] and Sağlam et al. [5] to contribute to the
theory in this research domain [33, 42]. Our framework
can help practitioners assess the specific requirements
related to their blockchain use case imposed by
the GDPR and take measures to implement GDPR
compliance by design. Following the ADR method also
allows us to derive four key learnings, which serve as
Design Principles (DPs) for reconciling data protection
compliance on blockchain-based platforms that can be
used across various domains. These DPs should be
considered as guidelines to establish GDPR-compliant
blockchain-based architectures by design.
DP1: Acknowledge GDPR compliance by
design: Consider requirements of GDPR throughout
the whole development cycle of the blockchain
prototype.
To achieve GDPR compliance of blockchain-based
solutions, data protection requirements should be
considered from the very beginning of the development
cycle. This ensures that compliance of GDPR is
achieved by design. For example, if researchers
and practitioners notice conflicts with the GDPR as
data cannot be properly anonymized, cryptographic
techniques like ZKPs can be integrated in architectural
considerations from the very beginning.
DP2: Use state-of-the-art cryptography: Ensure
to always use latest but established cryptographic
techniques for hiding personal data.
Secondly, we recommend to always use the latest
cryptographic techniques to prevent security issues
owing to outdated or broken cryptography. On the other
hand, cryptographic mechanisms need to be sufficiently
established to prevent incidents as occurred recently
in IOTA [51]. This DP also underlines that we do
not claim the comprehensiveness of our framework
for all future developments. As both regulation and
cryptographic techniques and methods change at fast
pace, the frameworks need to account for recent and
expected future developments.
DP3: Differentiate aims of data processing:
Different anonymization techniques allow to prove
data or computational integrity.
Thirdly, our research shows that the underlying
use case should determine the choice of appropriate
anonymization techniques. Generally, we distinguish
between proving the integrity of historic data and
proving the integrity of computations performed on data.
Based on this distinction, appropriate anonymization
techniques may be chosen that prove integrity but can be
reconciled with the GDPR. In specific, most blockchain
applications struggle not only with Art. 16 and 17 GDPR
but also with the initial distribution of potentially
sensitive information. In many applications, these
issues can be overcome from a legal perspective using
the techniques mentioned above as only non-sensitive
information is shared. Thus, we encourage researchers
and practitioners to differentiate their data processing
aims before developing a blockchain-based solution.
DP4: Review all relevant laws: Do not only
evaluate the reconciliation of GDPR but also further
industry-specific laws.
Lastly, our research highlighted that the GDPR
is not the only relevant law in the context of legal
compliance of blockchain applications. As GDPR
represents a domain-independent regulation for data
processing, industry-specific laws must be evaluated
as well. For example, the German Metering Point
Operation Act further regulates data processing in
the energy sector. Only if domain-specific laws are
taken into consideration, fully compliant solutions
can be promoted. Information exposure can also be
problematic beyond personal data, for example, antitrust
regulation restricts the sharing of business secrets with
competitors.
To conclude, our field research and literature
review highlighted that the exposure of sensitive
information in general and GDPR-compliance in
particular represent a pressing challenge for productive
blockchain applications. Against this backdrop, we
contribute a generic framework that supports the
assessment and creation of GDPR-compliant blockchain
applications. To the best of our knowledge, our
framework is the first that distinguishes between
Page 4638
data integrity and computational integrity. Moreover,
we derive design principles for the development of
compliant blockchain-based solutions. Our framework
helps practitioners to assess the implications of the
data at hand to be used in the blockchain use case
from a GDPR perspective. Depending on the use
case, different anonymization techniques can enable
GDPR compliance by design. The design principles
that we developed aim to guide practitioners to
design and develop blockchain applications that are
GDPR-compliant by design.
Although having pursued a rigorous research
approach, we acknowledge limitations of our study.
While Haque et al. [6] provide a comprehensive
overview of compliance issues, we mainly focused on
the right of rectification and erasure of personal data
and only briefly reflected on additional requirements
like purpose limitation. Thus, we motivate future
researchers to investigate further compliance issues in
a detailed manner. In addition, while the GDPR
represents one of the most comprehensive privacy
legislations [53], we expect that our results also apply
to other regulations such as the CCPA. Also, the
proposed framework has been validated by practitioners
in the energy sector and legal experts successfully
applied to create a blockchain prototype that reconciles
GDPR by design. Most importantly, due to the
fast-paced development of the research field, we do not
claim comprehensiveness of the covered anonymization
techniques. While the framework takes into account
Merkle trees and ZKPs, we motivate future researchers
to integrate further developments and standards for
secure computation (e.g., multi-party computation and
homomorphic encryption) and methods for statistic
information disclosure (e.g., differential privacy) [52].
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